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COMMENT
How HONG KONG LAW WILL CHANGE WHEN
ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW IS IMPLEMENTED
Article 23 of the Basic Law (BL 23) requires the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region (HKSAR) to "enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of
treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's
Government". It also deals with issues of state secrets and the activities of
foreign political organisations in Hong Kong. Many of the issues raised by BL
23 are considered to be politically sensitive. Ever since the Basic Law was
enacted in 1990 and brought into effect in July 1997 there have been anxi-
eties over the implementation of BL 23.
What is interesting about BL 23 is that it does not directly prohibit treason,
sedition, subversion and related actions, nor does it define the precise mean-
ing of these words. Instead, it empowers the HKSAR - in practice its legislature
- to enact laws to define and penalise such actions. This is an important
aspect of the autonomy of the HKSAR under the concept of "one country,
two systems", which demonstrated respect for the existing social, economic
and legal systems in Hong Kong at the time of the handover of Hong Kong to
China in 1997 by ensuring that mainland laws and practices will not be im-
posed on Hong Kong.
In the five years since the handover, nothing has happened in Hong Kong
that raises the issues touched upon by BL 23. It has never been suggested that
any activity in Hong Kong constitutes a possible threat to China's national
security. It is therefore understandable that the publication by the HKSAR
Government on 24 September 2002 of the consultation document on Pro-
posals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law caused much public anxiety.
Hong Kong people are concerned that the Hong Kong or Beijing Govern-
ments may have sinister intentions to curtail civil liberties and human rights
in Hong Kong and extend mainland standards regarding matters such as sub-
version or the theft of state secrets to Hong Kong. However, from the legal or
constitutional perspective, it seems that BL 23 does impose a legal obligation
on the HKSAR Government to enact laws on the matters covered by it. The
Government would be abdicating its constitutional duty if it did not address
the question of the implementation of BL 23 within a reasonable time after
the establishment of the SAR, and instead postponed the matter indefinitely.
Why, then, did it take the HKSAR Government as long as five years to
come up with its proposal on the implementation of BL 23? This can perhaps
be explained by the fact that immediately after the establishment of the
HKSAR Government in 1997, there were many matters for it to address with
a higher priority than BL 23. After all, as mentioned above, nothing has
happened in Hong Kong since the handover that comes close to the kind of
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activities to be proscribed under BL 23. Legislation under BL 23 therefore has
no sense of urgency or pressing necessity. Another possible factor is that the
matter is politically sensitive and therefore very difficult to deal with, par-
ticularly if the mainland laws on matters of treason, subversion, etc are not to
be imported wholesale into Hong Kong. The existing Hong Kong law that is
relevant to these matters had to be thoroughly reviewed, and foreign legisla-
tive models had to be researched and compared to those of Hong Kong.
The consultation exercise on the Government's legislative proposal on
the implementation of BL 23 concluded with the publication on 28 January
2003 of the multi-volume Compendium of Submissions and the Government's
announcement on the same day of nine sets of clarifications to or modifica-
tions of the original proposal. This was followed by the publication of the
National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill (the Bill) on 13 February and
its first reading in the Legislative Council (LegCo) on 26 February. Although
the Bill has not been enacted at the time of writing, it seems that the basic
principles underlying it have the support of the majority of LegCo members.
Therefore, it is now possible to see in broad outline how Hong Kong's laws
will change as a result of the proposed legislation on the implementation of
BL 23.
Treason
The existing definition of treason in the Crimes Ordinance will be narrowed
to cover only situations where the accused joins foreign armed forces at war
with China, instigates foreign armed forces to invade China or assists a public
enemy at war with China. The term "war" used in the existing law will be
narrowed to include only open armed conflicts (and not mere riots and civil
disturbances). The existing "treasonable offences" (which are extremely broad
and criminalise all "overt acts" or publications manifesting treasonous
intention), the offence of assault on the sovereign, and the common law of-
fences of "compounding treason" (corruption in deciding not to prosecute
treason) and "misprision of treason" (failure to report treason) will be abolished.
The proposed reform of the law of treason as particularised above, together
with the proposed reform of the law of sedition discussed below, demonstrate
that the BL 23 exercise is not intended to make Hong Kong's laws more
draconian. Instead, it is an exercise to review and reform the existing law in
light of the principles enshrined in BL 23, and to remove repressive laws that
Hong Kong has inherited from its colonial era which are now out of date and
inconsistent with progressive notions of human rights.
2 Albert H. Y. Chen (2003) HKLJ
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Sedition
Like treason, sedition is an existing crime under Hong Kong's Crimes
Ordinance. The existing law of sedition, introduced by the British colonial
government and modelled on similar laws in other British colonies, is very
harsh, although it has not been strictly enforced in recent decades. For example,
any speech or publication that "brings into hatred or contempt or excite[s]
disaffection against the Hong Kong Government" is regarded as seditious under
the existing law. This law was actually used in 1952' to prosecute and con-
vict the publisher and editor of the pro-China newspaper in Hong Kong, Ta
Kung Po, for re-publishing an article from the People's Daily that was critical
of the colonial government. Furthermore, the existing law criminalises pos-
session and handling (eg printing, importing, displaying or selling) of seditious
publications. The Bill now proposes liberalising the existing law of sedition
by:
1 Narrowing the definition of sedition to confine it to situations where
there is incitement to commit treason, secession or subversion, or in-
citement to "engage in violent public disorder that would seriously
endanger the stability of the People's Republic of China". Thus, unless
the use of violence or serious criminal means is advocated (as discussed
below) for certain specified purposes, sedition will not be committed.
2 Abolishing the offence of possession of seditious publications.
3 Restricting the offence of "handling seditious publications" to situa-
tions where the accused actually intends to incite treason, subversion
or secession.
4 Incorporating into the definition of "seditious publications" the "like-
lihood" test in "principle 6" of the Johannesburg Principles on National
Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (adopted
at a conference in 1996 convened by Article 19, a London-based non-
governmental organisation) so that "seditious publications" are those
that are "likely to cause the commission of' the offence of treason,
subversion or secession.
Such proposed liberalisation of the sedition law is undoubtedly a welcome
development in respect of freedom of information and freedom of expression
and the press in the HKSAR.
I In the case of The Crown v Fei Yi-ming and Lee Tsung-ying (1952) 36 HKLR 133.
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Subversion and Secession
BL 23 requires that the HKSAR should legislate to prohibit "subversion" and
"(secession" - two concepts that are unknown to Hong Kong's existing law
but exist in mainland Chinese law. It is therefore necessary for the Govern-
ment to formulate new definitions of the crimes of subversion and secession.
Some people have expressed concern that any introduction of the mainland
concepts of subversion and secession into Hong Kong will be inconsistent
with the principles of "one country, two systems", of not changing Hong
Kong people's way of life and of not reducing the pre-1997 level of protection
of human rights in Hong Kong. The HKSAR Government has risen to the
challenge of legislating on subversion and secession by not importing the
relevant mainland laws and standards to Hong Kong, and by creatively
designing for these two crimes legislative models that are unique to the
HKSAR. Thus, according to the Bill, secession and subversion will be de-
fined as "withdraw[ing] any part of the PRC from its sovereignty" (in the
case of secession) and "disestablish[ing] the basic system of the PRC as estab-
lished by the Constitution of the PRC; overthrow[ing] the Central People's
Government; or intimidat[ing] the Central People's Government" (in the
case of subversion), in both cases by "engaging in war" or using "force or
serious criminal means that seriously endangers the stability of the PRC".2 It
should be noted that the definitions of secession and subversion proposed
for the HKSAR are much narrower than the corresponding definitions in
Articles 103 and 105 of the Chinese Criminal Code, which do not require
acts of violence as an essential element in the offences of secession and
subversion. However, the loose language used in the definitions in the Bill
still leaves much to be desired. It is hoped the definitions may be refined in
the committee stage of the Bill.
State Secrets
BL 23 also requires the HKSAR to legislate against theft of state secrets. The
protection of official secrets against espionage and unlawful disclosure is al-
ready provided for fairly adequately in the Official Secrets Ordinance 1997,
which was modelled on the corresponding British legislation. The Bill now
proposes three major amendments to this Ordinance. First, a new category of
official secrets is to be created to include information on "affairs concerning
the HKSAR which are, under the Basic Law, within the responsibility of the
Central Authorities", where disclosure is likely to endanger national security.
2 The means are similar to those "terrorist acts" defined in Hong Kong's United Nations (Antiterror-
ism Measures) Ordinance 2002.
4 Albert H. Y. Chen (2003) HKLJ
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This category of information is not provided for in the existing Ordinance,
which was enacted shortly before the handover. Secondly, it is proposed that
unauthorised and damaging disclosure of official secrets "acquired by means
of illegal access" - defined to mean computer hacking, theft, robbery, bur-
glary or bribery - be criminalised. This proposed amendment is apparently
designed to close a loophole in the existing law whereby a computer "hacker
may openly sell stolen protected information to a publisher who may then
openly publish the information for profit"' without the publisher committing
any offence under the existing official secrets law. Thirdly, the existing defi-
nition of "public servants" (which is crucial because official secrets are defined
mainly by reference to their being in the possession of public servants and
falling within the defined categories), which includes not only Hong Kong
civil servants but also "any person employed in the civil service of the Crown
in right of the United Kingdom" and "any member of the armed forces", will
be localised to refer only to Hong Kong civil servants. This proposed amend-
ment is significant because it limits the scope of official secrets covered by the
Ordinance and excludes official secrets in the hands of mainland Chinese
officials. Taken as a whole, the proposed amendments to the Official Secrets
Ordinance are reasonable and consistent with the spirit of "one country, two
systems". However, it remains to be seen whether the "public interest" and
"prior publication" defences advocated by the legal and journalistic commu-
nities in Hong Kong will be added to the Bill during its committee stage.
Proscribed Organisations
The requirements in BL 23 to prohibit links between local and foreign politi-
cal organisations were implemented by the amendment of the Societies
Ordinance at the time of the handover in 1997. Under this Ordinance, the
HKSAR Government has the power to prohibit the operation of a local
society or association on the ground of national security. The Government
is now proposing a set of amendments to the Societies Ordinance designed
to elaborate this power. According to the Bill, where a local organisation:
(a) has the objective of engaging in treason, secession, subversion, sedition or
spying; or (b) has committed or is attempting to commit treason, secession,
subversion, sedition or spying; or (c) is "subordinate to" an organisation in
mainland China which has been proscribed by the Central Authorities' open
decree for reasons of national security, the HKSAR's Secretary for Security
may proscribe the local organisation "if he reasonably believes that the pro-
scription is necessary in the interests of national security and is proportionate
for such purpose". The Hong Kong courts will have the power to review
3 Consultation Document, para 6.22.
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whether the proscription is justified by applying the human rights standards
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Part
(c) of the proposal faces much public opposition, but it seems unlikely that
the Government will agree to omit it at the committee stage of the Bill. The
policy behind the proposal is apparently to send a signal to deter people from
"making use of Hong Kong's free and open environment as a base against
national security and territorial integrity".4 Another controversial amend-
ment proposed in this regard empowers the Chief Justice to make rules on the
hearing of appeals against proscription that may enable the court, in cases
where disclosure of certain information is considered detrimental to national
security, "to hold proceedings in the absence of any person, including the
appellant and any legal representative appointed by him", although the court
may "appoint a legal practitioner to act in the interests of the appellant" in
such cases. The Government argues that precedents for such provisions exist
in Canada and Britain in the context of immigration and anti-terrorism laws
(eg the UK Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 and the Ter-
rorism Act 2000). However, in so far as the Bill has not brought the existing
system of appeals (to the Chief Executive in Council rather than the court)
against the cancellation of a society's registration or prohibition of a society's
operation (which may also be on the ground of national security) in line with
the proposed system of judicial appeals against proscription of local
organisations, there will be a significant anomaly in the law unless this prob-
lem is addressed at the committee stage of the present Bill.
Other Aspects
Space does not permit a detailed exploration here of other aspects of the Bill,
such as the right to trial by jury in all cases of treason, secession, subversion,
sedition and unlawful disclosure of official secrets; the extra-territorial appli-
cation of some offences; adjustment of levels of punishment; removal of existing
time limits for prosecution; and enhanced police powers of investigation. These
issues should be addressed in further research.
Conclusion
During the three-month consultation period for the legislative proposal be-
tween September and December 2002, public opinion in Hong Kong was
sharply divided; the debate was at times impassioned, and large-scale demon-
strations were organised by both supporters and opponents of the proposal,
Ibid., para 3.8.
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The vigour of the public debate on the issue and the active political partici-
pation of members of the public in this matter testify to the health of civil
society and the vitality of the democratic spirit in Hong Kong. We need not
be afraid of controversies. At the same time, scholars of Hong Kong law owe
a duty to the community to provide an objective assessment of the state of
our existing law and the extent to which it will be changed by the proposed
legislation implementing BL 23. And once the legislation is enacted, this
responsibility will pass to the strong and independent courts of the HKSAR
which will have to strike the correct balance between the defence of human
rights and the protection of national security as they interpret and apply the
legislation in cases litigated before them. It is hoped that such cases will be
extremely rare.
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